Application of Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT) Patterns to Reduce Crew Operations (RCO) by Shively, R. Jay et al.
  
Application of Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT) 
Patterns to Reduced Crew Operations (RCO) 
R. Jay Shively1,* Summer L. Brandt2, Joel Lachter2, Mike Matessa3, Garrett Sadler4, 
and Henri Battiste4 
1NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, USA 
robert.j.shively@nasa.gov 
2San Jose State University, Moffett Field, USA 
{summer.l.brandt, joel.lachter}@nasa.gov 
3Rockwell Collins, Moffett Field, USA 
mike.matessa@rockwellcollins.com 
4NVH Human Systems Integration, Moffett Field, USA 
garrett.g.sadler@nasa.gov, henri.battiste@gmail.com 
Abstract. Unmanned aerial systems, advanced cockpits, and air traffic man-
agement are all seeing dramatic increases in automation. However, while auto-
mation may take on some tasks previously performed by humans, humans will 
still be required to remain in the system for the foreseeable future. The collabo-
ration between humans and these increasingly autonomous systems will begin 
to resemble cooperation between teammates, rather than simple task allocation. 
It is critical to understand this human-autonomy teaming (HAT) to optimize 
these systems in the future. One methodology to understand HAT is by identify-
ing recurring patterns of HAT that have similar characteristics and solutions. 
This paper applies a methodology for identifying HAT patterns to an advanced 
cockpit project. 
Keywords: Design Patterns · Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT) · Reduced 
Crew Operations (RCO) 
1 Introduction 
In this paper we propose the use of design patterns to aid in characterizing commonly 
occurring human-autonomy teaming (HAT) situations. The concept of design pat-
terns, originally introduced by Christopher Alexander [1] in the context of architec-
tural design, and extended to the domain of software engineering by Beck and Cun-
ningham [2], provides abstractions that capture a general repeatable solution to com-
monly occurring problems. That is, they provide descriptions or templates for how to 
solve a problem that can be used in many different situations. While not finished de-
signs that can be transformed directly into code, these design patterns have served as 
aids to more efficient development. 
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More specifically, design patterns can speed up the development process by 
providing tested, proven development paradigms. Effective software design requires 
considering issues that may not become visible until later in the implementation. Re-
using design patterns helps to prevent subtle issues that can cause major problems and 
improves code readability for coders and architects familiar with the patterns. In addi-
tion, patterns allow developers to communicate using well-known, well-understood 
names for software interactions. 
We believe that the design of HAT solutions might also benefit from the use of 
patterns. In this paper, we will discuss the methodology for developing such patterns 
and examine example applications to a project investigating reduced crew size on 
commercial airlines. Because this project involves replacing one member of a tightly 
coupled team with automation, it provides a very ripe environment in which to apply 
this methodology. 
2 Design Patterns for Reduced Crew Operations 
NASA is currently investigating the feasibility of reduced crew operations (RCO) for 
transport category aircraft. RCO envisions having one pilot on board domestic flights, 
and two pilots on board long-haul operations, where one of the two pilots is often off 
of the flight deck resting in the bunk. An important element of NASA’s RCO research 
seeks to develop a concept of operation (ConOp) that covers the roles and responsibil-
ities of the principal human operators, the automation tools used by them, and the 
operating procedures for human-human and human-automation interaction. The hu-
man-automation function allocation, in particular, is an ongoing NASA focus, draw-
ing upon insights gathered from subject matter experts in industry, academia and gov-
ernment during technical interchange meetings and from empirical human-in-the-loop 
research [3,4,5]. 
The proposed NASA RCO ConOp [6] includes three basic human roles: the pilot 
on board (POB), the dispatcher, and when necessary, a ground pilot. The POB (unless 
incapacitated) would serve as the captain and pilot-in-command. As such, s/he would 
determine when to call on automation and ground support. The POB’s main tasks 
would be to manage risk and resources (both human and automation). 
Onboard automation would assist the POB with many tasks currently performed by 
the pilot monitoring, such as flight management system (FMS) input, assisting with 
checklists and validating inputs. 
Ground-based automation would assist the dispatcher in a variety of tasks. Dis-
patch tasks would be similar to current operations (e.g., preflight planning, monitoring 
aircraft positions, and enroute reroutes), but for those tasks currently performed joint-
ly with the pilot, the dispatchers (aided by automation) would absorb some of the 
POB’s workload (e.g., creating new flight plans, vetting them with air traffic control 
(ATC) and uplinking them to the aircraft). In this ConOp, automation would assist the 
dispatcher with creation of pre-flight briefings, flight path monitoring, selection of 
divert airports, and optimizing reroutes. Automation would also be responsible for 
monitoring many flights and alerting the dispatcher to aircraft needing assistance. In 
  
addition, the POB could call the dispatcher for consultation on important decisions 
where s/he might previously have consulted the first officer (e.g., diagnosing an air-
craft system caution light or determining the fuel consequences of a holding instruc-
tion). 
Under high-workload or challenging off-nominal operating conditions, such as an 
engine fire or cabin depressurization, where the flight’s needs exceed the capacity of a 
dispatcher responsible for many other aircraft, a ground pilot would be assigned to the 
flight for dedicated piloting support. The ground pilot would have remote access to 
fly the aircraft as needed. Similarly, if the POB was found to be incapacitated (by 
automation or the dispatcher), a ground pilot would be assigned to that aircraft and 
assume the role of pilot-in-command. 
The remainder of this paper will discuss the methodology for developing design 
patterns for RCO. 
3 Steps to Build a Pattern 
Schulte [7, 8], in conjunction with Neerincx and Lange [9], proposed using a set of 
primitives to build HAT patterns. They proposed three types of agents: 1) human 
operators, 2) intelligent/cognitive agents, and 3) automated tools. The agents, which 
can either be co-located or distributed, can be connected by cooperative, supervisory, 
or communications links. 
As described by Schulte [7, 8], a critically important preliminary task in the con-
struction of HAT patterns is the identification of the Work Objective. The Work Ob-
jective identifies the aspects that initiate and characterize the mission or purpose of 
the work. The Work Objective provides a black box description of the Work Process, 
which includes informational inputs (e.g., ATC clearance), environmental inputs (e.g., 
airspace) and supply inputs (e.g., fuel). The Work Process, utilizing all of these inputs 
and the Work Objective, produces a Work Process Output (e.g., reducing target speed) 
on the Work Object (e.g., speed of aircraft) that distributes meaningful physical and 
conceptual actions to human-automation team members within the overall Work Envi-
ronment. 
Using these primitives, we have been working to build patterns that describe HAT 
in the RCO context. An initial use case was developed, and by walking through each 
step, the agents and links required to depict one such pattern were identified. 
3.1 Initial Use Case 1: Fuel Leak 
FLYSKY12 is en route from SFO to BOS. There is one POB and a dispatcher flight 
following. 
In this initial use case, there is an onboard fuel leak. The Work Objective is to man-
age the fuel leak. The Work Process consists of the steps necessary to resolve the 
situation. Here, the output is a divert to an alternate airport. Fig. 1 provides a legend 
for the steps and links detailed in Fig. 2. The culmination of steps produced our initial 
RCO design pattern. 
  
Fig. 1. Legend for RCO design pattern steps; Cooperative and supervisory links imply commu-
nication 
 
Step 1. Fuel leak in the left fuel tank. Onboard 
automation detects fuel imbalance and alerts POB 
and dispatcher. This requires a communication link. 
Automation is shown as a tool because this could be 
something as simple as a sensor. 
 
Step 2. Diagnosis. POB requests automation diag-
nose fuel imbalance. Automation reports to POB a 
leak in left tank. The POB is asking for diagnosis, 
indicating supervisory control and that the automa-
tion has a certain level of intelligence, thus we have 
redrawn the automation as a cognitive agent. 
 
Step 3. Fault management. POB requests that 
agent manage fuel. Agent opens the cross feed and 
turns off the pumps in the right side to draw fuel 
from the left. The POB is delegating control of the 
fuel system to the agent. The agent uses onboard 






















Step 4. Decision to divert. POB contacts dispatch 
about need to divert. There is coordination between 
POB and dispatcher. 
 
Step 5. Divert planning. Dispatcher requests divert 
planning from dispatch automation. The dispatcher 
is delegating to the automation. Divert planning 
automation is shown as an agent because it uses 
multiple strategies to accomplish the task. 
 
 
Step 6. Digital datalink. Dispatcher uplinks flight 
plan to POB. POB inspects the flight plan and 
agrees. The dispatcher and POB cooperate to agree 
on the flight plan. 
 
Step 7. Execution. POB requests agent coordinate 
divert with ATC. Agent reports divert is approved. 
POB tells agent to execute. The agent cooperates 
with ATC. The POB is jointly responsible for safety 
of flight with ATC. In this case s/he has delegated 
the responsibility for working with ATC to the 
agent. 
 
Fig. 2. RCO initial use case design pattern steps 
4 Use Cases 
Having developed a base HAT pattern for RCO, it now needs to be determined if it is 
general enough to account for other use cases. In this next section, additional use 









4.1 Use Case 2: Thunderstorm 
Initial Conditions. FLYSKY12 is en route from SFO to ORD. There is one POB and 
a dispatcher flight following. The Work Objective is to avoid a thunderstorm. Again, 
the Work Process consists of the steps necessary to resolve the situation with the out-
put to divert to an alternate airport. Fig. 3 represents the final design pattern. 
Step 1. Detection and alerting of thunderstorm. Dispatch automation informs 
dispatcher of convective cell growing on flight path of FLYSKY12.  This requires a 
communication link between dispatch automation and the dispatcher (covered by 
supervisory link in the pattern).   
Step 2. Dispatcher informs POB of cell. This requires a link between the dis-
patcher and the POB. This link is as a cooperative link (as in the pattern) because, by 
regulation, the dispatcher and POB share responsibility for safe operation of the 
flight (including detecting and responding to thunderstorms). 
Step 3. Modification of flight plan. Dispatcher requests modified flight plan from 
dispatch automation. Dispatch automation returns modified flight plan. The delega-
tion of flight path planning to the automation requires a supervisory link. As with the 
previous use case, this planning requires consideration of multiple strategies making 
this automation an agent. 
Step 4. Dispatch uplinks modified flight plan. Uses the link between dispatch 
and POB from Step 2. 
Step 5. POB requests clearance for flight plan from ATC. POB and ATC are 
both responsible for safety of flight and thus this is a cooperative link. This differs 
from the pattern above where the link from ATC to the aircraft went to the agent. 
Step 6. ATC rejects clearance. ATC tells POB that aircraft must take additional 
six-minute delay for new arrival slot coming into ORD. Cooperative link from Step 5. 
Step 7. Planning for delay. POB asks automation for alternatives to take six-
minute delay. Automation provides two alternatives: a) Slow down, saves fuel but 
risks further movement/growth of cell b) Hold past cell, more fuel burn but lower risk 
of further deviations. Like Steps 2 and 3 in the previous use case, POB is delegating 
this task to the automation, requiring a supervisory link. The automation is develop-
ing multiple strategies for taking the delay, making it an agent. 
Step 9. POB requests clearance from ATC, modified with holding after passing 
cell; ATC approves request. Same cooperative link from Steps 2 and 5. 
Step 10. POB tells agent to implement the new clearance. Agent sets autopilot 
in accord with clearance. Once again, the POB delegates tasks to the agent. As in the 
previous use case, the agent uses tools to perform the task. 
This use case is also well captured by the pattern developed in our initial use case. 
The only modifications are that in the initial use case the POB delegates negotiation 
with ATC to the agent, while in this use case he or she negotiates directly and that the 
onboard automation never communicates directly with the dispatcher. This is perhaps 
unsurprising since the basic structure of this pattern is specified in our RCO ConOp. 
The POB and the assigned dispatcher are jointly responsible for the flight, assisting 
each other in a cooperative relationship. Similarly, the POB and the ATC responsible 
for the sector of airspace containing the aircraft have complementary roles in assuring 
  
safety of flight, and thus must also cooperate. Further, our ConOp specifies that both 
dispatch and the POB acquire significantly enhanced automation. Thus, in most situa-
tions the operators, tools, agents, and their underlying relationships are fixed by our 
ConOp. Further, at a high level, the Work Objective remains constant for RCO: get-
ting the aircraft to the best airport possible for the airline (usually its destination and 
ideally on time) while maintaining safety of flight. The relevant informational, envi-
ronmental, and supply inputs also remain constant (although possibly with different 
weightings) across operations. Of course, a number of specifics could change depend-
ing on the situation. For example, while the POB and dispatch are jointly responsible 
for a flight, it is not necessary that dispatch be contacted in every situation (e.g., if 















Fig. 3. Use case 2 design pattern 
 
4.2 Use Case 3: Non-cooperative Pilot 
There are, however, use cases for which we believe more significant changes to this 
pattern would be necessary. In particular, pilots may become incapacitated, or, in rare 
but well publicized instances, become threats to the aircraft themselves (e.g., Jet Blue 
191, Germanwings 9525, EgyptAir 990). If we hope to guarantee safety and security 
in these cases, the dispatcher and possibly the cognitive agent will need significant 
authority to effectively supervise the POB. Here we outline a possible use case in-
volving such a situation. 
Initial Conditions. FLYSKY12 DEN-DCA on final into DCA. There is one POB and 
a dispatcher flight following. The Work Objective is to complete a safe flight with a 
potentially incapacitated pilot. Again, the Work Process is the steps necessary to re-
solve the situation with the output being the onboard agent assuming the pilot-in-
command role. Fig. 4 represents the final design pattern. 
Step 1. Pilot takes aircraft off course. At WIRSO (424 feet) POB decouples au-





tion detects deviation from flight plan and alerts POB and dispatcher. Same communi-
cation links from Step 1 of the initial use case. 
Step 2. ATC intervenes. ATC directs POB to correct course. As with previous use 
cases, ATC is also responsible for safety of flight, indicating a cooperative link. 
Step 3. Automation calculates point of no return, informs pilot that s/he will be 
locked out if no corrective action is taken by that time (in this case the time would be 
minimal; the White House is less than 30 seconds from WIRSO). As the aircraft ap-
proaches restricted airspace, the automation takes on additional authority, marking a 
change in the relationship between the agent and the POB: the agent is now supervis-
ing the POB rather than being supervised by the POB. 
Step 4. POB locked out. No corrective action is taken. The agent locks out POB 
and alerts the dispatcher. (Dispatch assumed to have the power to return control to 
POB, but does not here.) The agent continues its supervisory role relative to the POB. 
Step 5. Agent squawks 777 and corrects course. The agent has supervisory con-
trol over the FMS and other flight deck controls as in the previous use cases.  
Step 6. Establishing link with dispatcher. Agent informs dispatcher of corrective 
action. This requires only a communication link between the agent and the dispatcher 
as in the previous use cases. However, it is presumed that, at this point the agent 
would either form a cooperative link with the dispatcher or the dispatcher would take 
over supervision of the agent. 
In this use case, major changes were needed to accommodate the events. Yet this 
change is only reflected in the subtle change from the POB and the cognitive agent 
cooperating with the agent supervising the POB, requiring that the agent have a great 
deal of autonomy and authority. Intuitively, this change in authority is a major change 
in the pattern; however, the level of authority (although implied through delegation) 
has not been an explicit component of these design patterns. Perhaps to fully explore 











5 HAT Measures 
Our HAT design patterns effectively captured the similarities between our first two 
use cases, as well as the structural differences between those and the final use case 
with the non-cooperative pilot. However, the reader may be concerned that in devel-
oping these patterns we have made a number of arbitrary distinctions. In fact, we 
spent considerable time debating which piece of automation was a cognitive agent 
versus a tool and the type of connections between the various agents. To aid in mak-
ing these decisions, we turned to a number of metrics that have been used by re-
searchers in related fields. Specifically, we looked at the degree to which agents ex-
hibited situation awareness indexed by the levels of situation awareness described by 
Endsley [10], the management capabilities of agents as indexed by Sheridan’s levels 
of automation [11], and decision-making ability assessed using the Non-Technical 
Skills framework (NOTECHS) categories [12]. In addition to categorizing the deci-
sion-making authority of the agent, NOTECHS have several other scales that allow us 
to assess whether communications links involve Management, Joint Decision making, 
and/or Cooperation. 
We used these measures to give a more quantitative assessment of the automation 
in our initial use case. In Fig. 5, we re-examined each step, giving the reasoning be-
hind these assessments. A new design pattern was drawn in Fig. 6 to reflect the addi-
tional measures. 
 
Step 1. Fuel leak in the left fuel tank. 
Onboard automation detects fuel imbal-
ance and alerts POB and dispatcher. 
No CRM skill indicated 
Step 2. Diagnosis. POB requests automa-
tion diagnose fuel imbalance. Automation 
reports to POB a leak in left tank. 
Management skill in a supervisory 
relationship between POB and agent 
(labeled M), with the agent having a 
capability to identify problems (Deci-
sion Making level one, labeled D1) 
Step 3. Fault Management. POB re-
quests that agent manage fuel. Agent 
opens the cross feed and turns off the 
pumps in the right side to draw fuel from 
the left. 
Management in a supervisory rela-
tionship between agent and aircraft 
(labeled M), with the agent informing 
the POB only if necessary (Sheridan 
management level nine, labeled M9) 
Step 4. Decision to divert. POB contacts 
dispatch about need to divert. 
A relationship between POB and 
dispatcher with Cooperation (aware-
ness of needs of other), Decision 
Making (eliciting divert options), and 
Management (delegating divert loca-
tion task to the dispatcher), labeled 
C/D/M 
  
Step 5. Divert planning. Dispatcher re-
quests divert planning from dispatch au-
tomation. 
Management in a supervisory rela-
tionship between dispatcher and agent 
(labeled M), with the agent having a 
Decision Making ability to select an 
option (NOTECHS level three, la-
beled D3) 
Step 6. Digital datalink. Dispatcher up-
links flight plan to POB. 
Continued relationship between POB 
and dispatcher with Cooperation 
(awareness of needs of other), Deci-
sion Making (eliciting divert options), 
and Management (delegating divert 
location task to the dispatcher), la-
beled C/D/M 
Step 7. Execution. POB requests agent 
coordinate divert with ATC. Agent re-
ports divert is approved. POB tells agent 
to execute. 
Management in a supervisory rela-
tionship between POB and agent 
(labeled M). Cooperative Decision 
Making between the agent and ATC 
(labeled D), with the agent having a 
Decision Making ability to select an 
option (NOTECHS level three, la-
beled D3) 
Fig. 5. Re-examination of RCO design pattern using additional measures 
 
 
Fig. 6. RCO design pattern using additional measures 
6 Discussion 
In this relatively new field of human-autonomy teaming, this analysis suggests that 
defining design patterns may help describe and prescribe human-autonomy relation-












resident in a reduced crew operations design. Building on a use case, researchers were 
able to identify a basic pattern (see Fig. 1). This pattern describes the agents (human 
and otherwise) and the logical connections between them. Once this base pattern was 
defined, new use cases evaluated its generality. For nominal and routine off-nominal 
operations, most of the relationships were captured. However, for extreme use cases 
(non-cooperating pilot), new relationships needed to be added. Further, it became 
clear that the dimension of authority needed to be added to fully describe the envi-
ronment. It may be that a family of patterns is required to fully describe complex 
situations in all contexts, but that a single basic pattern may suffice for normal opera-
tions. 
A challenge with the present exercise was getting the correct level of detail in de-
fining HAT design pattern elements. Highly general elements can gloss over critical 
distinctions, while narrowly defined elements can result in overly complex and hard 
to generalize patterns. The cooperative link is a case in point. In this exercise we real-
ized that there were two varieties of this link, one reflecting relatively unstructured 
collaboration between humans and/or agents working on a single task (e.g., a ground 
operator and a pilot simultaneously and collaboratively searching for the best divert 
airport); and one reflecting a more structured coordination while working on separate 
subtasks (e.g., an automated agent developing a list of divert options and an operator 
culling this list while generating new criteria/constraints for the automated agent). 
Answering whether or not to include distinctions such as these will probably require 
multiple efforts to generate and apply HAT design patterns. 
We have seen that a design pattern (or family of design patterns) can be used to de-
scribe this environment and its relationships, but how can it be of use? One way is to 
re-use patterns when developing system designs in other (new) environments. We can 
use patterns to prescribe the relationships and level of automation required to achieve 
design goals. Design patterns can also be used in a diagnostic manner. The non-
cooperating pilot example showed that the cognitive agent needed a higher degree of 
authority than had previously been assigned. Exercising the use cases can determine if 
a pattern (or existing system) is able to execute that case and can diagnose where 
additional autonomy and/or authority might be required. 
Members of NATO HFM-247 working group are applying this methodology to 
their individual projects to determine the overall generalizability and utility. If suc-
cessful, this may be a significant step forward in understanding human-autonomy 
teaming. 
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